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ABSTRACT

LOOKING THROUGH THE LENS OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES:
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERSONALITY, COGNITIVE CONTROL,
LANGUAGE PROCESSING, AND GENES
Ranjani Prabhakaran
Sharon L. Thompson-Schill
The study of individual differences in cognitive abilities and personality traits has the
potential to inform our understanding of how the processing mechanisms underlying
different behaviors are organized. In the current set of studies, we applied an individualdifferences approach to the study of sources of variation in individuals’ personality traits,
cognitive control, and linguistic ambiguity resolution abilities. In Chapter 2, we
investigated the relationship between motivational personality traits and cognitive control
abilities. The results demonstrated that individual differences in the personality traits of
approach and avoidance predict performance on verbal and nonverbal versions of the
Stroop task. These results are suggestive of a hemisphere-specific organization of
approach/avoidance personality traits and verbal/nonverbal cognitive control abilities.
Furthermore, these results are consistent with previous findings of hemispheric
asymmetry in terms of the distribution of dopaminergic and norephinephrine signaling
pathways. In Chapter 3, we investigated the extent to which the same processing
mechanisms are used to resolve lexical and syntactic conflict. In addition, we
vi

incorporated a behavioral genetics approach to investigate this commonality at the
neurotransmitter level. We explored whether genetic variation in catechol-Omethyltransferase (COMT), a gene that regulates the catabolism of dopamine in
prefrontal cortex, is related to individuals’ ability to resolve lexical and syntactic conflict.
The results of this study demonstrated that individual differences in the ability to resolve
lexical conflict are related to variation in syntactic conflict resolution abilities. This
finding supports constraint satisfaction theories of language processing. We also showed
that those individuals with the variant of the COMT gene resulting in less availability of
dopamine at the synapse tended to have greater difficulty processing both lexical and
syntactic ambiguities. These results provide novel evidence that dopamine plays a role in
linguistic ambiguity resolution. In sum, the results from the current set of studies reveal
how an individual-differences approach can be used to investigate several different
factors involved in the context-dependent regulation of behavior.
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION
That individuals within a species demonstrate variation is hardly a new
observation. In his seminal work, On the Origin of Species, Charles Darwin (1859) noted
the following:

No one supposes that all the individuals of the same species are cast in the same
actual mould…These individual differences generally affect what naturalists consider
unimportant parts; but I could show by a long catalogue of facts, that parts which must
be called important, whether viewed under a physiological or classificatory point of
view, sometimes vary in the individuals of the same species. (p. 31)

Despite the recognition that individuals demonstrate variation across behaviors, much of
the research in the field of experimental psychology has viewed human behavior through
the lens of the group. That is, the individual has only been considered in so far as he or
she contributes to the estimate of central tendency for the particular behavior being
studied. The source of variation around this central tendency in individuals’ behaviors
has long been viewed as a source of noise in studies aimed at uncovering the
commonalities across humans (Cronbach, 1957; Kosslyn et al., 2002; Thompson-Schill,
Braver, & Jonides, 2005). By using the group as a means of sculpting psychological
theory, the field of experimental psychology rests on the assumption that individual and
group are inter-changeable. However, as indicated by Darwin’s observations as well as
1

our own in everyday life, this is clearly not the case. Researchers thus run the risk of
drawing erroneous conclusions about the individual. In an introduction to a special issue
of Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience on the topic of individual-differences
research, Thompson-Schill et al. (2005) cautioned that “in some cases the estimate of the
sample mean might not actually describe anyone very well. Finally, and most
importantly, the mark of a theory’s explanatory power is the degree to which it makes
successful predictions not only about the central tendency of a population, but also about
the individuals within that population” (p.115).
Based on these lines of reasoning, several researchers have advocated for an
approach that employs both a group-based (experimental) and an individual-based
(correlational) view of behavior. Cronbach (1957) urged for such a union, noting that as
a result of combining these approaches, “we will come to realize that organism and
treatment are an inseparable pair and that no psychologists can dismiss one of the other as
error variance” (p. 683). Years later, Kosslyn et al. (2002) stressed the importance of
unifying these two approaches to psychology by providing several examples of how the
study of individual differences can be used to shed light on the processing mechanisms
underlying behavioral phenomena, such as mental imagery (see also Thompson-Schill et
al., 2005).

Despite the initial reluctance of the field of experimental psychology, the use

of an individual-differences approach has become more prevalent in recent times in
several domains of psychology, including personality, decision-making, social reasoning,
perceptual processing, and cognitive control abilities.
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In the studies described in Chapters 2 and 3, we applied an individual-differences
approach to the study of the following topics. In Chapter 2, we investigated the
interaction between motivational personality traits and cognitive control abilities. In
Chapter 3, we investigated the extent to which the same processing mechanisms are used
to resolve ambiguities across lexical and syntactic domains of language processing.
Furthermore, we incorporated a behavioral genetics approach to investigate this
commonality at the neurotransmitter level. Below, we describe these topics in more
detail as well as the utility of applying an individual-differences approach to their study.
Cognitive control has served as the focus of much research aimed at uncovering
the nature of the processing mechanisms that flexibly guide goal-directed behavior.
Several researchers have used an individual-differences approach to determine the
“atoms” of cognitive control. Miyake and colleagues (e.g. Friedman & Miyake, 2004;
Friedman et al., 2008; Miyake et al., 2000) have found related, yet separable, components
of cognitive control comprising response inhibition (“the ability to inhibit dominant,
automatic, or prepotent responses”), updating (“the ability to monitor incoming
information for relevance to the task at hand and then appropriately update by replacing
old, no longer relevant information with newer, more relevant information”), and setshifting (“the ability to flexibly shift back and forth between tasks or mental sets”)
(Friedman et al., 2008, p. 201). A parallel line of individual-differences research
involves the study of affective personality traits related to goal-directed behavior, or
motivational personality traits. Approach, or sensitivity to reward and positive affect,
and avoidance, or sensitivity to punishment and negative affect, are thought to comprise
3

fundamental dimensions of personality (see Carver, Sutton, & Scheier, 2000; Elliot &
Thrash, 2002). Davidson and colleagues (e.g. Davidson, 1992; Davidson & Fox, 1989;
Sutton & Davidson, 1997) have amassed a great deal of evidence showing that individual
differences in approach and avoidance sensitivity are related to hemispheric asymmetry
of neural activity. Whereas individuals with higher approach sensitivity demonstrate
greater left prefrontal activity, those with higher avoidance sensitivity tend to
demonstrate greater right prefrontal activity.
These lines of research have merged due to the demonstration that personality and
emotion can influence cognitive control abilities (see Gray, 2004 for a review). Emotion
has been viewed as a form of context, such that emotional states and personality traits can
flexibly modulate and guide goal-directed behavior (Gray & Braver, 2002; Revelle,
1993). The study of the interaction between emotion and cognitive control has been used
to shed light on the neural organization of these processing mechanisms. Similar to the
hemispheric asymmetry described above for approach and avoidance sensitivities, several
researchers have suggested that verbal and nonverbal working memory systems are
organized in a hemispheric-specific fashion (e.g. Smith & Jonides, 1999). Although there
is evidence to suggest that approach and avoidance states are differentially associated
with verbal and nonverbal working memory (Gray, 2001; Gray, Braver, & Raichle, 2002;
Shackman et al., 2006), previous studies have tended to use working memory tasks that
tap several different processing mechanisms. Thus, it remains unclear as to whether
these domain-specific relationships also apply to cognitive control abilities.
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The goal of Chapter 2 of this dissertation was to refine our understanding of the
interaction between personality and cognitive control. By using the Stroop task, which
isolates a single cognitive control factor (response inhibition), and manipulating content
domain (verbal/nonverbal), we were able to examine the association between approach
and avoidance with verbal and nonverbal cognitive control abilities. Furthermore, we
investigated approach and avoidance sensitivity at the trait level, in contrast to the state
manipulations employed by Gray and colleagues (2001, 2002). This allowed us to
explore the relationship between variation in performance on one of the most commonly
used tasks in cognitive control research and variation in stable personality characteristics.
This approach builds on the findings that individuals can vary in both personality traits as
well as in their cognitive control abilities and goes beyond these findings to ask how
individual differences in one system are associated with individual differences in the
other.
Whereas the focus of Chapter 2 was elucidating the differences between cognitive
control abilities in verbal and nonverbal domains in terms of their relationships with
personality traits, in Chapter 3 we investigated the extent to which there is commonality
between ambiguity resolution mechanisms. Ambiguity serves as a source of conflict
between competing representations and responses in a variety of domains of cognition.
In language processing, a great deal of research has focused on the processing
mechanisms underlying the resolution of lexical and syntactic ambiguities. Whereas
some researchers have argued that separate mechanisms resolve lexical and syntactic
ambiguities (e.g. Frazier & Rayner, 1982; Ferreira & Clifton, 1986; van Gompel,
5

Pickering, & Traxler, 2001), others have contended that the same processing mechanisms
are used to resolve both types of linguistic ambiguities (e.g. MacDonald, Pearlmutter, &
Seidenberg, 1994; Trueswell & Tanenhaus, 1994). These latter theories, known as
“constraint-satisfaction” or “constraint-based lexicalist” theories of language processing,
propose that syntactic ambiguities are actually ambiguities at the lexical level, and are
thus processed using the same mechanisms. Inherent in this assertion is an individualdifferences prediction: namely, that there should be correlated variation in individuals’
abilities to resolve lexical and syntactic ambiguities. Indeed, this result is necessary to
obtain in order to endorse constraint-satisfaction theories of language processing; yet, this
relationship has not yet been investigated. In an article entitled “Individual Differences
as a Crucible in Theory Construction”, Benton Underwood (1975) outlined the
importance of an individual-differences approach to experimental psychology research.
In particular, Underwood suggested that individual differences should be used as a
necessary component of theory construction and evaluation. Thus, if a theory predicts a
relationship between processes A and B, this is fundamentally an individual differences
prediction. If, in fact, the measure of a subject’s process A turns out to be unrelated (i.e.
shows a zero correlation) to the measure of the subject’s process B, this evidence should
be used to modify, or in some cases, reject the theory. Thus, as an essential test of
constraint-satisfaction theory, Chapter 3 describes our investigation of the relationship
between subjects’ abilities to resolve lexical and syntactic ambiguities.
An important additional consideration concerns the nature of this linguistic
ambiguity resolution mechanism. That is, if there is commonality in processing across
6

lexical and syntactic ambiguity resolution tasks, what can we say about how this
mechanism operates? Evidence from recent neuroimaging (e.g. January, Trueswell, &
Thompson-Schill, 2009; Ye & Zhou, 2009) and neuropsychological studies (e.g. Novick,
Kan, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2009) suggests that more general cognitive control
mechanisms may underlie the resolution of linguistic ambiguities. In Chapter 3, we used
a behavioral genetics approach to further explore this hypothesis. Recent developments
in behavioral genetics have enabled the investigation of individual differences at the level
of the gene. The study of individual differences at multiple levels spanning behavior and
genes allows for a more comprehensive and powerful examination of the sources of
variation in humans. In Chapter 3, we demonstrate how the application of behavioral
genetic techniques to the study of linguistic ambiguity resolution mechanisms illustrates
the commonality across these mechanisms at the neurotransmitter level. In particular, we
explored whether genetic variation in catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT), a gene
responsible for the regulation of dopamine levels in prefrontal cortex and associated with
variation in cognitive control abilities (see Goldberg & Weinberger, 2004 for a review),
is related to both syntactic and lexical ambiguity resolution abilities. The use of this
approach allowed us to bridge the literatures on genetic variation in COMT, cognitive
control abilities, and the processing mechanisms underlying linguistic ambiguity
resolution. As Underwood (1975) stated, “The whole idea behind behavioral theory is to
reduce the number of independent processes to a minimum; to find that performance on
two apparently diverse tasks is mediated at least in part by a single, more elementary,
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process is a step toward this long-range goal” (p. 133). The study described in Chapter 3
represents such a step.
In sum, the goal of the studies presented in Chapters 2 and 3 was to use an
individual-differences approach to shed light on the processing mechanisms underlying
the context-dependent regulation of behavior.

8

CHAPTER 2: PERSONALITY TRAITS PREDICT COGNITIVE CONTROL
ABILITIES
Abstract
Previous studies suggest that the personality traits of approach and avoidance impact
cognitive control abilities. However, the nature of this relationship remains unclear. In
the current study, we aimed to address the following two questions: 1) Do approach and
avoidance predict individual differences in a specific cognitive control ability, namely the
ability to respond based on task-relevant information while ignoring task-irrelevant
information, and 2) Are these personality traits differentially associated with verbal and
nonverbal cognitive control abilities? The findings from the current study indicate that
approach and avoidance trait sensitivities predict Stroop performance. Furthermore,
whereas approach sensitivity was predictive of verbal Stroop performance, avoidance
sensitivity was predictive of nonverbal Stroop performance. We discuss these results in
the context of prior literature reporting differential distribution of neurochemical
pathways across the left and right hemispheres and note that the current findings are
suggestive of the integration of emotion and cognition in a hemisphere-specific manner.

9

Introduction
The relationship between personality traits and behavior has long served as a topic
of interest in psychology. Several researchers have proposed that the motivational
personality traits or “affective styles” (Davidson, 1992) of approach and avoidance serve
as fundamental dimensions of personality and behavior (e.g. Carver, Sutton, & Scheier,
2000; Elliot & Thrash, 2002). Approach motivation refers to behavior toward desired
stimuli, sensitivity to reward cues, and is associated with positive affective states.
Avoidance motivation is characterized by behavior away from aversive stimuli,
sensitivity to punishment cues, and is associated with negative affective states (see
Carver et al., 2000 for a review). Indeed, a great deal of prior animal research suggests
that approach and avoidance constitute core motivational systems guiding behavior that
rely on distinct neural substrates (Gray, 1972; 1990; Schneirla, 1959). The behavioral
activation system (BAS), which facilitates approach behavior and demonstrates
responsivity to reward cues, is thought to be mediated by dopaminergic pathways (Depue
& Collins, 1999). The behavioral inhibition system (BIS), which facilitates avoidance
and is associated with sensitivity to punishment, has been linked to functioning of the
septo-hippocampal system (Gray, 1972).
Much of the evidence for the mapping of BAS and BIS sensitivities onto neural
substrates in humans comes from electroencephalogram (EEG) and neuroimaging studies
demonstrating a relationship between positive affective state and trait variables and
greater left frontal activity, on the one hand, and negative affective state and trait
variables and greater right frontal activity, on the other hand (e.g. Harmon-Jones &
10

Gable, 2009; Herrington et al., 2005; Sutton & Davidson, 1997; c.f. Coan & Allen, 2003).
This frontal cortical asymmetry has been more specifically related to the distinction
between approach and avoidance motivation in particular, rather than positive and
negative affect in general (e.g. Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Harmon-Jones, 2003).
Additionally, the extent to which positive affective states tap approach motivation has
been found to influence the type of attentional processes recruited in a given task and the
extent of relative left frontal cortical activity (see Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2009; Rowe,
Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007). For example, Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson (2007) demonstrated
that the inducement of a positive emotional state resulted in increased interference effects
on the flanker task relative to neutral or sad emotional states. From this finding, Rowe et
al. (2007) concluded that positive affective states serve to broaden or increase the scope
of perceptual attention. In contrast, Gable & Harmon-Jones (2008; 2009) have shown
that positive affect high in approach motivation results in a reduced scope of attention,
reflected in reduced focus on global versus local components of stimuli, and increased
relative left frontal activity. These results suggest the importance of motivational
variables in impacting cognitive control abilities (see also Amodio, Master, Yee, &
Taylor, 2008; Gray, 2004; Gray, Braver, & Raichle, 2002; Revelle, 1993).
Previous evidence also suggests that approach and avoidance motivation may be
differentially associated with verbal and nonverbal cognitive control abilities. Gray
(2001) demonstrated that the induction of approach motivational states improved verbal
working memory performance and impaired spatial working memory performance,
whereas avoidance motivational states improved spatial working memory performance
11

and impaired verbal working memory performance (see also Shackman et al., 2006).
Gray (2001) suggested that these selective influences of motivational states on cognitive
control abilities may stem from hemispheric lateralization underlying both
approach/avoidance motivation and verbal/nonverbal working memory. That is, the left
hemisphere may support both verbal working memory and approach motivation, whereas
the right hemisphere may support both nonverbal/spatial working memory and avoidance
motivation (see also Heller & Nitschke, 1997). Although Gray’s (2001) findings provide
intriguing evidence for selective modulation of cognitive control abilities by different
motivational states, they also raise several questions. For example, do approach and
avoidance motivations impact specific cognitive control abilities? The n-back task,
which was used in Gray (2001), taps several different processing mechanisms, including
active maintenance, updating, and response selection (Smith & Jonides, 1997). Thus, the
locus of impact of approach and avoidance sensitivity on verbal and nonverbal cognitive
control abilities requires further investigation.
Additionally, Gray (2001) focused on the role of motivational states in
influencing verbal and nonverbal working memory performance, noting that those
subjects with higher levels of approach and avoidance motivation at the trait level
demonstrated increased effects of the motivational state induction on working memory
performance. In the current study, we sought to determine whether individual differences
in trait motivation, in the absence of state inductions, predict verbal and nonverbal
cognitive control abilities. If so, this finding would have important implications for our
understanding of the processing mechanisms underlying both motivational and cognitive
12

control systems. Additionally, this finding has the potential to uncover a source of
variability in subjects’ cognitive control abilities, a topic of study for a vast number of
laboratory experiments in cognitive psychology.
Another question raised by previous research concerns the relationship between
other dimensions of personality and cognitive control abilities. Extraversion and
Neuroticism have been proposed as two dimensions of personality that are associated
with positive and negative affect, respectively (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964). Lieberman
(2000) has suggested that extraverts are characterized by more efficient central executive
processing compared to introverts (c.f. Gray, 2001). These findings raise the question of
whether Extraversion and Neuroticism modulate cognitive control abilities in a selective
fashion, similar to BIS and BAS sensitivity. Furthermore, it has been proposed that the
commonality across different dimensions of personality lies in the distinction between
approach and avoidance motivation (e.g. Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Carver et al., 2000).
Elliot and Thrash (2002) demonstrated that measures of positive affective disposition,
Extraversion, and BAS loaded on a single factor, which they labeled as Approach
Temperament, and measures of negative affective disposition, Neuroticism, and BIS
loaded on a different factor, labeled as Avoidance Temperament. Based on these results,
Elliot and Thrash (2002) suggested that Approach and Avoidance Temperaments
represent core dimensions of personality that guide goal-directed behavior.
The goals of the current study were two-fold. First, we sought to determine
whether individual differences in trait sensitivity to the BIS/BAS and
Neuroticism/Extraversion dimensions are predictive of performance on the Stroop task
13

(Stroop, 1935), which taps a specific cognitive control ability: responding on the basis of
task-relevant information while ignoring task-irrelevant information. Second, we aimed
to determine whether BIS/BAS and Neuroticism/Extraversion trait sensitivity are
differentially predictive of verbal and nonverbal Stroop performance. Based on the
results of Gray (2001) and Elliot & Thrash (2002), we predicted that an Approach factor,
reflecting the commonality across BAS and Extraversion, would predict better verbal
Stroop performance (i.e. smaller conflict effects), whereas an Avoidance factor, reflecting
the commonality across BIS and Neuroticism, would predict better nonverbal Stroop
performance.
Methods
Participants
Seventy-nine participants (26 men, 53 women, ages 18-35) participated in this study.
Data from one additional participant were excluded from all analyses due to at-chance
performance on the nonverbal Stroop task. All subjects were right-handed, native
speakers of English, and were not taking any psychoactive medications. Subjects were
paid at the rate of $10/hour for their participation, and the testing session lasted
approximately 1.5 hours. All subjects gave informed consent prior to participating in the
experiment according to guidelines established by the Institutional Review Board of the
University of Pennsylvania.
Materials
Verbal Stroop Task

14

Subjects indicated the font color of a presented color word via button press on a computer
keyboard. Three possible response options were available to the subject: yellow, green,
and blue. A colored square corresponding to each color was affixed to a different key on
the computer keyboard, and subjects were instructed to press the key corresponding to the
appropriate color as quickly and as accurately as possible. Subjects were instructed to
use only their right hand when indicating their response. The verbal Stroop task featured
two main types of trials: congruent and incongruent. For congruent trials, the font color
matched the meaning of the word (e.g. “yellow” presented in yellow font color). Two
types of incongruent trials were included (see Milham et al., 2001). For half of the
incongruent trials, the font color did not match the meaning of the word, although the
word did name a possible response (e.g. “yellow” presented in a blue font color). For the
other half of incongruent trials, color words that were not potential response options (i.e.
“red”, “brown”, “orange”) were presented in yellow, green, or blue (e.g. “red” presented
in a blue font color). The inclusion of two types of incongruent trials was designed to
address experimental questions that are not germane to the goals of the current study.
Thus, all reported results collapse across both types of incongruent trials.
For each trial, subjects were first presented with a fixation cross for 1000 ms.
The stimulus was then presented for 1500 ms, followed by a 500 ms inter-trial interval
consisting of a blank screen. Subjects completed four blocks of each task, where each
block comprised 72 trials: 36 congruent trials and 36 incongruent trials. Trials were
presented in a fixed pseudo-randomized order across all subjects. Subjects also
performed 24 practice trials (12 congruent trials and 12 incongruent trials) prior to the
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task in order to familiarize them with the stimuli and task procedures. Stimuli were
presented and responses were collected with E-prime software (Schneider, Eschman, &
Zuccolotto, 2002).
Nonverbal Stroop Task
A novel variant of the nonverbal Stroop task that was originally developed by Pomerantz
(1983) was used in the current study. Subjects viewed a moving square window (global
motion) containing moving dots (local motion) and indicated the direction of (local)
motion of the dots, by pressing either the left or right key of two designated keys on a
computer keyboard. Subjects were instructed to use only their right hand when indicating
their response. The window and dots appeared in black and were presented on a white
background. As in the verbal Stroop task, subjects were presented with two types of
trials: congruent and incongruent. For congruent trials, local and global motion occurred
in the same direction (e.g. window moving to the right containing dots moving to the
right). Two types of incongruent trials were included. For half of the incongruent trials,
local motion occurred in the direction opposite of global motion, which was also a
potential response option (e.g. window moving to the left containing dots moving to the
right). For the other half of incongruent trials, global motion occurred in either the up or
down direction, which were not potential response options (e.g. window moving up
containing dots moving to the right).

As for the verbal Stroop task, all reported results

collapse across both types of incongruent trials for the nonverbal Stroop task.
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Trial timing parameters and the number of trials in each condition were the same
as for the verbal Stroop task described above. Stimuli were presented and responses were
collected with MATLAB® software (2007a, The Mathworks).
Behavioral Inhibition/Behavioral Activation Scales (BIS/BAS)
Subjects completed the BIS/BAS scales (Carver & White, 1994). These scales were
developed to assess trait sensitivity to the punishment (BIS) and reward (BAS)
responsive systems. The BIS scale consists of 7 items, each of which is designed to
assess individuals’ sensitivity to punishment cues (e.g. “If I think something unpleasant is
going to happen, I get pretty worked up”). The BAS scale consists of a total of 13 items,
each of which assesses individuals’ sensitivity to cues of reward. The BAS scale
comprises three sub-scales: BAS-Drive (4 items; e.g. “When I want something, I usually
go all-out to get it”), BAS-Fun Seeking (4 items; e.g. “I’m always willing to try
something new if I think it will be fun”), and BAS-Reward Responsiveness (5 items; e.g.
“When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly”). Subjects responded using a
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). The sums of responses to
items from each scale were used as BIS and BAS scores in further analyses. BAS scores
correspond to the sum of responses to items from the three BAS subscales.
Carver & White (1994) demonstrated the high internal reliability (α ranging from
0.66 – 0.76) and high test-retest reliability (ranging from 0.59-0.69) for these scales.
Additionally, Carver & White (1994) demonstrated the convergent and discriminant
validity of the BIS/BAS scales as well as their predictive power by showing that subjects’
BIS scores were predictive of self-reported anxiety in response to punishment, and
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subjects’ BAS scores were predictive of self-reported happiness levels in response to
reward.
Eysenck Personality Inventory (Form A)
Subjects completed Form A of the Eysenck Personality Inventory (Eysenck & Eysenck,
1964), which comprises the following dimensions: Extraversion (24 items, e.g. “Do other
people think of you as being very lively?”), Neuroticism (24 items, e.g. “Would you call
yourself tense or highly strung?”), and Lie (9 items, e.g. “Are all your habits good and
desirable ones?”). The Neuroticism scale was designed to measure subjects’ tendency to
experience negative affect, whereas the Extraversion scale was designed to assess
subjects’ sociability, impulsivity, and activity levels. Subjects responded by pressing
either “1” (yes) or “2” (no). “No” responses were later recoded as “0” for scoring
purposes. The interpretation of the Lie dimension has been the subject of debate (see
Knowles & Kreitman, 1965), and as it does not constitute the focus of the current study,
we report only the results from the Extraversion and Neuroticism scales. Several studies
(e.g. Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964) have demonstrated the high internal reliability (α
ranging from 0.80 – 0.90) and high test-retest reliability (ranging from 0.85 – 0.94) of the
Extraversion and Neuroticism scales.
Procedure
Subjects completed the tasks and questionnaires in the following order: Verbal Stroop,
Nonverbal Stroop, BIS/BAS scales, and the Eysenck Personality Inventory (Form A).
Tasks and questionnaires were administered to all subjects in the same order in order to
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minimize measurement error resulting from participant x task order interactions (e.g.
Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Friedman et al., 2008; Miyake et al., 2000).
Statistical Procedures
Conflict effects were more robust in the first two blocks compared with all four blocks
for the nonverbal Stroop task (t[78] = 3.06, p < 0.01). This is likely due to subjects
becoming more practiced over the course of the nonverbal Stroop task, resulting in
smaller conflict effects across all four blocks of the task. Thus, in order to better assess
the relationship between personality variables and conflict effects, all reported results
include data from only the first 2 blocks for both the verbal and nonverbal Stroop tasks.
For both verbal and nonverbal Stroop tasks, a within-subject trimming procedure
recommended by Wilcox & Keselman (2003) was applied to each subject’s reaction time
(RT) data. For each subject and each condition, RTs whose deviation from the median
was greater than 3.32 times the median absolute deviation were excluded prior to
calculating mean RTs. This procedure resulted in no more than 9.4 % of observations
excluded in each condition. Mean RTs and percent error rates for verbal and nonverbal
Stroop tasks are presented in Table 2.1. RT conflict effects expressed as difference
scores (incongruent RT – congruent RT) and as percentage RT conflict effects
[(incongruent RT – congruent RT)/congruent RT] are presented in Table 2.2. Only
correct trials were included in all RT analyses.
Due to low error rates for both verbal and nonverbal Stroop tasks, all correlational
analyses were performed on the RT data, which revealed more robust conflict effects.
Furthermore, in order to ensure that these correlations did not merely reflect effects of
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personality variables on overall speed for congruent and incongruent conditions, all
correlations were calculated using percentage RT conflict effects. In order to improve
normality and reduce the influence of extreme values, an additional trimming procedure
was employed. Observations greater than three standard deviations from the group mean
were replaced with observations three standard deviations from the mean for each
variable included in correlational analyses (see Friedman et al., 2008). No more than 1.3
% of the observations for each variable were affected by this additional trimming
procedure.
Results
BIS/BAS Scales & Eysenck Personality Inventory (Form A)
Means, standard deviations, ranges, reliabilities, and correlations for the BIS, BAS,
Neuroticism, and Extraversion scales are presented in Table 2.3. These values are similar
to those reported in previous studies using these measures (e.g. Carver & White, 1994;
Gray, 2001; Knowles & Kreitman, 1965). BIS and total BAS scores (across all three
subscales) were not significantly correlated, and Neuroticism and Extraversion scores
were also not significantly correlated. In order to ensure the independent contributions of
BIS and BAS scores to Stroop performance, all reported correlations with BIS scores
control for BAS scores (and vice versa). Additionally, in order to present the correlations
with Neuroticism and Extraversion in a parallel fashion to the BIS/BAS results, all
reported correlations with Neuroticism scores control for Extraversion scores (and vice
versa).
Stroop Performance
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For the verbal Stroop task, subjects demonstrated significantly longer reaction times
(t[78] = 13.68, p < 0.001) and higher error rates (t[78] = 4.14, p < 0.001) for incongruent
compared to congruent trials. Similarly, for the nonverbal Stroop task, subjects
demonstrated significantly longer reaction times (t[78] = 5.60, p < 0.001) and higher
error rates (t[78] = 5.27, p < 0.001) for incongruent compared to congruent trials.
Verbal Stroop & Personality
We first examined the relationship between reaction times for verbal Stroop congruent
and incongruent conditions with BIS/BAS and Neuroticism/Extraversion scores.
Separate repeated measures ANCOVAs were performed for BIS/BAS and
Neuroticism/Extraversion, with condition (congruent/incongruent) as a within-subjects
factor, and BIS/BAS and Neuroticism/Extraversion scores as covariates. A significant
BAS x condition interaction effect (F[1,76] = 4.10, p < 0.05) and a marginally significant
Extraversion x condition interaction effect (F[1,76] = 3.52, p = 0.064) were found. The
condition x BIS and condition x Neuroticism interaction effects failed to approach
significance (F’s < 1).
In order to examine these interaction effects with BAS and Extraversion further,
correlations were calculated between these personality measures and verbal Stroop
percentage RT conflict effects. A marginally significant negative correlation was found
between verbal Stroop percentage RT conflict and BAS total scores (r = -0.20, p = 0.076)
(Figure 2.1 A)1. Additionally, a significant negative correlation was found between

1

All reported correlations were also calculated without controlling for the relevant personality variables,
and both correlational and partial correlational analyses yielded similar results. All reported correlations in
the text are partial correlations in order to ensure the independent contributions of personality variables to
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Extraversion and verbal Stroop percentage RT conflict effects (r = -0.223, p < 0.05)
(Figure 2.1 B). Thus, those subjects who had higher BAS and Extraversion scores tended
to demonstrate smaller verbal Stroop conflict effects.
Nonverbal Stroop & Personality
As for the verbal Stroop task, separate repeated measures ANCOVAs were performed for
BIS/BAS and Neuroticism/Extraversion, with condition (congruent/incongruent) as a
within-subjects factor, and BIS/BAS and Neuroticism/Extraversion scores as covariates.
A significant BIS x condition interaction effect (F[1,76] = 4.72, p < 0.05) and marginally
significant Neuroticism x condition interaction effect (F[1,76] = 2.92, p = 0.092) were
found. Interestingly, we also found a marginally significant condition x Extraversion
interaction effect (F[1,76] = 3.33, p = 0.072). However, the condition x BAS interaction
effect failed to approach significance (F < 1).
We further investigated the interaction effects with BIS, Neuroticism, and
Extraversion by calculating correlations between these measures and nonverbal Stroop
percentage RT conflict effects. We found a significant relationship between BIS scores
and nonverbal Stroop percentage RT conflict effects (r = 0.25, p < 0.05) (Figure 2.2 A);
however, the correlation between Neuroticism scores and nonverbal Stroop percentage
RT conflict effects failed to reach significance (r = 0.17, p = 0.13) (Figure 2.2 B).
Interestingly, both of these correlations were in the positive direction, indicating that
higher self-reported BIS and Neuroticism predicted larger nonverbal Stroop conflict

verbal and nonverbal Stroop conflict effects. However, for ease of interpretability of the axes representing
personality measures, all correlations depicted in Figures 1 and 2 represent correlations between the
personality measures and conflict effects, without controlling for other personality variables.
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effects. We return to potential explanations for these findings in the Discussion section.
A marginally significant negative correlation was also found between Extraversion and
nonverbal Stroop percentage RT conflict effects (r = -0.22, p = 0.053).
Approach/Avoidance Factors & Stroop Performance: Exploratory Factor Analysis
A principal components exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using varimax rotation was
performed on the following six personality variables: BAS-Reward Responsiveness,
BAS-Fun Seeking, BAS-Drive, Extraversion, BIS, and Neuroticism scores.2 Two factors
with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 were obtained. The first factor, on which the BAS
subscales and Extraversion loaded most highly, accounted for 37.28 % of the variance.
The second factor, on which the BIS and Neuroticism scales loaded most highly,
accounted for 25.89 % of the variance. Factor loadings for both factors are presented in
Table 2.4. These results indicate two distinct factors that are similar to the Approach and
Avoidance Temperaments derived by Elliot & Thrash (2002).
We next correlated regression factor scores for the Approach and Avoidance
factors with subjects’ verbal and nonverbal Stroop percentage RT conflict effects. The
Approach factor score predicted smaller verbal Stroop percentage RT conflict effects (r =
-0.24, p < 0.05) (Figure 2.1 C); however, the Approach factor score was not significantly
associated with subjects’ nonverbal Stroop percentage RT conflict effects (r = -0.09, p =
0.42). The Avoidance factor score predicted larger nonverbal Stroop percentage RT
conflict effects (r = 0.23, p < 0.05) (Figure 2.2 C); however, the Avoidance factor score

2

A principal components EFA was also performed using direct oblimin rotation. This EFA yielded highly
similar factor loadings and the same pattern of correlations between regression factor scores and verbal and
nonverbal Stroop conflict effects.
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was not significantly associated with subjects’ verbal Stroop percentage RT conflict
effects (r = -0.03, p = 0.806). Although this pattern of results is suggestive of domainspecificity, the strength of these correlations was not significantly different between
verbal and nonverbal Stroop percentage RT conflict effects for the Approach or
Avoidance Factors (p ‘s> 0.12).
Discussion
The previous literature suggests that personality traits influence cognitive control
abilities. However, several of these studies (e.g. Gray, 2001; Gray et al., 2002;
Shackman et al., 2006) have employed the n-back task, which precludes specification of
which processing mechanisms are impacted by different motivational systems. The
current study provides novel evidence indicating that approach and avoidance trait
sensitivities were predictive of performance on the Stroop task, suggesting that these
personality traits are associated with a specific cognitive control ability.
The results of the current study also provide novel evidence indicating that
whereas approach sensitivity was predictive of verbal (and not nonverbal) Stroop
performance, avoidance sensitivity was predictive of nonverbal (and not verbal) Stroop
performance. The association between approach and verbal cognitive control ability, on
the one hand, and avoidance and nonverbal cognitive control ability, on the other hand, is
consistent with a large body of literature on hemispheric differences in affective and
cognitive processing (e.g. Harmon-Jones, 2003; Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2009; Heller &
Nitschke, 1997; Kelley et al., 1998; Morimoto et al., 2008; Sutton & Davidson, 1997).
Gray (2001) found that approach motivational states were associated with facilitated
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verbal n-back performance and impaired spatial n-back performance. The opposite
pattern of results was found for avoidance motivational states (c.f. Shackman et al.,
2006). Our results are consistent with Gray (2001) in terms of the association between
approach sensitivity and facilitated performance on a verbal cognitive control task
(although not with the association between approach and impaired nonverbal cognitive
control performance). However, based on Gray (2001)’s findings, we had predicted that
avoidance trait sensitivity would be associated with smaller nonverbal Stroop conflict
effects. That is, if the right hemisphere supports nonverbal processing and an avoidant
motivational style, one might expect that individuals higher in avoidance motivation
might be facilitated on the nonverbal Stroop task. However, our results indicate that
higher avoidance trait sensitivity resulted in larger nonverbal Stroop conflict effects.
What could explain this pattern of results?
One possible explanation stems from previous research suggesting that whereas
the left hemisphere is specialized for local processing, the right hemisphere is specialized
for global, or more holistic, processing (e.g. van Kleeck, 1989; Delis, Robertson, &
Efron, 1986). Furthermore, Volberg & Hübner (2004) have demonstrated that
hemispheric differences are more pronounced in situations of conflict between local and
global dimensions of stimuli. In light of these results, it is important to note that the
nonverbal Stroop task used in the current study involves conflict between local and
global dimensions. In particular, subjects were instructed to report the direction of
motion of local elements (i.e. the moving dots) in the face of interference from global
motion (i.e. the moving box). Thus, a more global or holistic processing style may lead
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to larger nonverbal Stroop conflict effects due to increased attention to the global,
irrelevant dimension of the stimulus. This account would lead one to predict that if
subjects were required to focus on the global dimension of a stimulus while ignoring the
local elements, greater avoidance trait sensitivity might be associated with smaller
nonverbal conflict effects. This prediction as well as the relationship between avoidance
trait sensitivity and performance on other nonverbal conflict tasks, including those that do
not feature conflict between local and global dimensions, should be investigated in future
research.
It is important to note that the strength of the correlations between approach and
verbal Stroop conflict effects, on the one hand, and approach and nonverbal Stroop
conflict effects, on the other hand, were not significantly different. Similarly, no
significant difference was found in the strength of correlations between avoidance and
verbal and nonverbal Stroop conflict effects. We do not wish to over-interpret null
results, and it is possible that with a larger sample size, the correlation between approach
and nonverbal Stroop (as well as the correlation between avoidance and verbal Stroop)
may reach significance. Nonetheless, the pattern of results reported in the current study
is suggestive of domain-specificity in the interaction between cognitive and affective
processes. Although the association between approach/avoidance motivation and
verbal/nonverbal cognitive control ability is consistent with previously reported results
pertaining to hemispheric lateralization, the question remains as to what exactly this
lateralization may reflect. As noted by Gray (2001), previous research suggests that
hemispheric specialization for cognitive and affective processing may stem from
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differential distribution of neurotransmitter pathways across the right and left
hemispheres. Whereas dopamine levels tend to be higher in the left hemisphere (Glick,
Ross, & Hough, 1982), higher levels of norepinephrine and serotonin have been found in
the right hemisphere (Gottfries, Perris, & Roos, 1974; Oke, Keller, Mefford, & Adams,
1978). This differential activity of neurotransmitter pathways across the left and right
hemispheres has been tied to different modes of attentional processing, which in turn,
have been associated with differential affective and cognitive consequences (see Tucker
& Williamson, 1984 for a review). For example, the greater activity of dopamine
pathways in the left hemisphere has been associated with more tonic forms of attention.
The greater activity of norepinephrine and serotonin pathways in the right hemisphere has
been associated with arousal and a global, receptive mode of information processing.
Furthermore, research in non-human animals has implicated dopaminergic pathways in
mediating extraversion and the BAS, whereas noradrenergic and serotonergic pathways
have been proposed to mediate neuroticism and the BIS (Depue & Collins, 1999; Gray &
McNaughton, 2000; Wallace & Newman, 1997).
In light of these previous findings, Braver, Gray, & Burgess (2008) have proposed
a link between approach sensitivity and a proactive mode of cognitive control, which
involves the active, sustained maintenance of task-relevant information. In contrast,
Braver et al. (2008) have suggested that avoidance sensitivity may be associated with a
reactive mode of cognitive control, which operates in a transient fashion and is triggered
in response to a stimulus. Thus, it is possible that the greater dopamine activity in the left
hemisphere underlies approach sensitivity and increased maintenance of task-relevant
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information, resulting in smaller conflict effects in the domain supported by the left
hemisphere (i.e. verbal). In contrast, the greater activity of the norepinephrine and
serotonergic systems in the right hemisphere may underlie avoidance sensitivity and a
more reactive, global mode of control, resulting in larger conflict effects in the domain
supported by the right hemisphere (i.e. nonverbal). Although the current study was not
designed to explicitly test this hemispheric hypothesis, it appears to be a plausible
explanation for the results of the current study and should be investigated in further
research. Furthermore, given the demonstration of unity and diversity of executive
functions (e.g. Miyake et al., 2000), future studies should investigate whether individual
differences in approach and avoidance are predictive of other cognitive control abilities,
such as updating and set-shifting.
In sum, we found that personality traits are associated with cognitive control
abilities. Higher approach trait sensitivity was associated with increased ability to ignore
task-irrelevant information in the verbal domain, whereas higher avoidance trait
sensitivity was associated with decreased ability to ignore task-irrelevant information in
the nonverbal domain. Furthermore, we have shown that individual differences in
personality traits, in the absence of state manipulations, are associated with individual
differences in cognitive control abilities. By demonstrating the association between
personality traits and a specific cognitive control ability, these results serve to refine our
understanding of the nature of the interaction between personality and cognition.
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Table 2.1. Performance Summary for Verbal and Nonverbal Stroop Tasks.

Condition

Mean RT

SD

Mean % Error

SD

Verbal Stroop
Congruent
Incongruent

556
611

81
96

2.4
4.1

2.4
4

Nonverbal Stroop
Congruent
Incongruent

546
584

104
142

1.3
4.7

1.9
6.3

Note. RTs are given in milliseconds. SD corresponds to standard deviation. N = 79 for
verbal and nonverbal Stroop tasks.
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Table 2.2. Conflict Effects for Verbal and Nonverbal Stroop Tasks.
Conflict Condition RT Conflict SD % RT Conflict SD Reliability Skewness Kurtosis
Verbal Stroop
Incongruent

55

36

9.9

6

0.68

-0.101

-0.051

Nonverbal Stroop
Incongruent

36

51

6.1

8.2

0.88

1.35

1.79

Note. Conflict condition, incongruent trials compared to the congruent condition; RT
Conflict, mean reaction time difference scores in milliseconds; % RT Conflict, mean
percentage RT conflict ([incongruent-congruent]/congruent); Reliability, split-half (oddeven) correlations for percentage RT conflict effects adjusted with the Spearman-Brown
prophecy formula; Skewness and Kurtosis, skewness and kurtosis statistics for
percentage RT conflict effects. SD corresponds to standard deviation. N = 79 for verbal
and nonverbal Stroop tasks.
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Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics for Self-Report Personality Trait Measures.
Zero-order correlations (r)
Trait measure
BIS
BAS (Total)
Extraversion
Neuroticism

Range
12-28
28-50
6-20
2-23

M
20.94
40.23
11.86
10.82

SD
3.57
4.6
3.06
4.92

Reliability
0.81
0.8
0.51
0.82

BIS
-0.142
-0.309 **
0.593 **

BAS(Total)
0.395 **
-0.092

Extraversion
-0.039

Note. BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System; BAS (Total) = Behavioral Activation System
(sum of the three BAS subscale scores). Reliability was calculated using Cronbach’s
alpha. SD corresponds to standard deviation. N = 79 for verbal and nonverbal Stroop
tasks.
** p < 0.05.
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Table 2.4. Approach and Avoidance Factor Loadings.

Factor Loadings
Trait measure
BAS Reward Responsiveness
BAS Drive
BAS Fun Seeking
Extraversion
BIS
Neuroticism

Approach
0.76
0.69
0.76
0.60
-0.12
0.03

Avoidance
0.27
0.04
-0.35
-0.33
0.91
0.8

Note. BAS = Behavioral Activation System; BIS = Behavioral Inhibition System.
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Figure Captions

Figure 2.1. Correlations between verbal percentage RT conflict effects (N = 79) and (A)
BAS total scores (B) Extraversion scores (C) Approach factor scores. Lines shown
indicate trend lines. Corresponding Pearson r coefficients for partial correlations
controlling for relevant personality variables provided in main text.

Figure 2.2. Correlations between nonverbal percentage RT conflict effects (N = 79) and
(A) BIS scores (B) Neuroticism scores (C) Avoidance factor scores. Lines shown
indicate trend lines. Corresponding Pearson r coefficients for partial correlations
controlling for relevant personality variables provided in main text.

33

Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.2.
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CHAPTER 3: COMMON MECHANISMS UNDERLYING LEXICAL AND
SYNTACTIC AMBIGUITY RESOLUTION

Abstract
Within the domain of language processing, an important unresolved question is whether
the same processing mechanisms are involved in lexical and syntactic ambiguity
resolution. The extent to which there is correlated variation in individuals’ abilities to
resolve lexical and syntactic ambiguities as well as the neurochemical underpinnings of
these mechanisms have not yet been investigated. In the current study, subjects were
tested on separate syntactic and lexical ambiguity resolution tasks, and they were also
genotyped for the val158met polymorphism in the catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT)
gene, involved in prefrontal cortical dopamine regulation. A significant relationship was
found between subjects’ ability to resolve ambiguities across both tasks. In particular,
those subjects who had more difficulty resolving lexical ambiguities also demonstrated
greater difficulty in revising their initial interpretation of syntactically ambiguous
sentences. Furthermore, preliminary evidence suggests that variation in a gene related to
dopamine regulation in prefrontal cortex is related to both lexical and syntactic ambiguity
resolution abilities. These results support constraint-satisfaction models of language
processing and suggest that similar processing mechanisms are employed to resolve both
lexical and syntactic ambiguities.
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Introduction
Ambiguity is prevalent in language processing. Consequently, a great deal of prior
research has focused on the mechanisms underlying the resolution of different types of
linguistic ambiguities, with a particular focus on lexical and syntactic ambiguities.
However, these lines of research have largely progressed in a parallel fashion under the
view that lexical and syntactic ambiguities are processed via different mechanisms. In
the current study, we provide evidence that challenges this view and suggests
commonality in processing of lexical and syntactic ambiguities. Below, we first review
the literature on lexical and syntactic ambiguity resolution, as they have been viewed
separately, and then discuss theories that propose a framework in which both types of
linguistic ambiguities are resolved using the same processing mechanisms.
Several researchers have aimed to determine how and at what point in time contextual
information influences lexical ambiguity resolution. Some have supported a modular
view of the lexicon, arguing that all meanings of a lexically ambiguous item are
automatically activated and that context plays a role in lexical selection only after initial
access of multiple meanings (e.g. Conrad, 1974; Lucas, 1987; Onifer & Swinney, 1981;
Prather & Swinney, 1988; Swinney, 1979; Tanenhaus, Leiman, & Seidenberg, 1979). An
alternative view is that context leads to selective access of only the contextually
appropriate meaning (e.g. Glucksberg, Kreuz, & Rho, 1986; Schvaneveldt, Meyer, &
Becker, 1976; Simpson, 1981).
The question of when context influences ambiguity resolution has also featured
prominently in debates on the nature of syntactic ambiguity resolution. The “garden
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path” model, a serial depth-first model, has played a dominant role in the field of research
on syntactic ambiguity resolution. This model proposes that upon encountering a
syntactic ambiguity, a single syntactic structure is considered and that context plays a role
in guiding interpretation only later in processing (e.g. Ferriera & Clifton, 1986; Frazier &
Clifton, 1997; Frazier & Rayner, 1982). According to these models, only the
grammatical structure of the sentence constrains its interpretation initially. If the initial
analysis proves to be incompatible with the information available, only then is an
alternative interpretation of the sentence constructed, incorporating non-syntactic features
(e.g. thematic and discourse) of the input.
The modular nature of serial models, such as the “garden-path model”, can be
contrasted with interactive models, namely “constraint-satisfaction”, or “constraint-based
lexicalist”, models of language processing. According to these theories, language
comprehension functions as an interactive process whereby evidence across several
linguistic representational levels, such as phonology, semantics, and syntax, is combined
in order to arrive at a single interpretation of the linguistic input (e.g. Gibson &
Pearlmutter, 1998; MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994; Novick, Trueswell, &
Thompson-Schill, 2005; Trueswell & Tanenhaus, 1994). Consistent with this framework,
some studies of lexical ambiguity resolution have demonstrated that context can serve as
a constraint in guiding lexical access (e.g. Duffy, Morris, & Rayner, 1988; Sereno,
Brewer, & O’Donnell, 2003; Swaab, Brown, & Hagoort, 2003; Tabossi, 1988) as well as
interpretation of syntactically ambiguous sentences early in processing (e.g. Altmann &
Steedman, 1988; Crain & Steedman, 1982; Novick, Thompson-Schill, & Trueswell,
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2008; St. John & McClelland, 1990; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy,
1995; Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill, & Logrip, 1999; Trueswell & Tanenhaus, 1994; c.f.
Clifton et al., 2003; Frazier, 1995; Pickering & Traxler, 1998; van Gompel, Pickering,
Pearson, & Liversedge, 2005 for alternative accounts). Under the constraint-satisfaction
framework, both lexical and syntactic ambiguities are thought to involve ambiguities
concerning lexical representations, where each lexical item is presumed to specify a great
deal of syntactic information, such as verb subcategorization and thematic role
information. Thus, in contrast to serial models of sentence comprehension, constraintsatisfaction models suggest that lexical and syntactic ambiguities are resolved using the
same processing mechanisms.
Another source of evidence for the commonality underlying lexical and syntactic
ambiguity resolution stems from the neuroimaging and neuropsychological literatures.
Several neuroimaging studies have found greater activation in left ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex (lVLPFC), a region implicated in cognitive control (see Miller & Cohen, 2001 for
a review), during the resolution of syntactic (e.g. January, Trueswell, & ThompsonSchill, 2009; Mason, Just, Keller, & Carpenter, 2003) and lexical (e.g. Bedny, McGill, &
Thompson-Schill, 2008; Rodd, Davis, & Johnsrude, 2005) ambiguities. Furthermore,
neural co-localization has been shown for syntactic ambiguity resolution as well as
performance on cognitive control tasks, such as the Stroop and flanker tasks (e.g. January
et al., 2009; Ye & Zhou, 2009). Critically, neuropsychological studies have also
demonstrated that damage to lVLPFC results in processing deficits when resolving
lexical (e.g. Bedny, Hulbert, & Thompson-Schill, 2007; Metzler, 2001) and syntactic
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(e.g. Novick, Kan, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2009) ambiguities. These results
provide intriguing evidence suggesting that cognitive control mechanisms underlie
lexical and syntactic ambiguity resolution.
A key thread running through previous investigations of lexical and syntactic
ambiguity resolution is that they have been investigated separately. For example,
Mendelsohn (2002) showed that individual differences in performance on the Verbal
Sorting Task (VST), a linguistic version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, predicted
the ability to resolve lexical and syntactic ambiguities in separate experiments, with
separate groups of participants. However, in order to more directly test the hypothesis
that a common mechanism is used to resolve both lexical and syntactic ambiguities, it is
necessary to examine the extent to which individual differences in lexical ambiguity
resolution abilities correlate with syntactic ambiguity resolution abilities. An example of
such an approach is provided by Novick et al. (2008), who found correlated variation in
performance across tasks tapping two different types of syntactic ambiguity:
prepositional-phrase attachment ambiguities in one task, and sentencecomplement/direct-object ambiguities in the other task. In the current study, we used a
similar individual differences approach to investigate whether common processing
mechanisms underlie lexical and syntactic ambiguity resolution. Subjects were tested on
tasks tapping lexical (homonyms and polysemous words) and syntactic (prepositionalphrase attachment ambiguities) ambiguity resolution abilities. Based on constraintsatisfaction models, we predicted that there would be correlated variation in performance
across tasks tapping each of these types of linguistic ambiguities.
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A second goal of the current study was to explore the neurobiology of these language
processes. The neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies discussed above have shed
light on the neural systems underlying lexical and syntactic ambiguity resolution.
However, less is known about the neurotransmitter systems underlying these processing
mechanisms. The importance of dopamine for prefrontal cortical function and cognitive
control has been demonstrated in several studies (e.g. Braver & Barch, 2002; Cohen,
Braver, & Brown, 2002; Goldman-Rakic, 1996; Miller & Cohen, 2001). A single
nucleotide polymorphism in the gene coding for catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT),
an enzyme involved in the catabolism of dopamine, has been linked to individual
differences in cognitive control abilities (e.g. Blasi et al., 2005; Bruder et al., 2005;
MacDonald, Carter, Flory, Ferrell, & Manuck, 2007; Mattay et al., 2003; see Goldberg &
Weinberger, 2004 for a review). The substitution of a single methionine (met) amino
acid instead of valine (val) at codon 158 leads to lower levels of COMT activity, resulting
in greater availability of dopamine at the synapse (Goldberg & Weinberger, 2004).
Individuals homozygous for the val allele tend to have lower availability of dopamine at
the synapse. These individuals also tend to demonstrate impaired performance on tasks
with cognitive control demands, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, compared to
individuals homozygous for the met allele (e.g. Blasi et al., 2005; Bruder et al., 2005;
MacDonald et al., 2007; Mattay et al., 2003, c.f. Ho, Wassink, O’Leary, Sheffield, &
Andreasen, 2005; Tsai et al., 2003). Despite the emphasis on variation in the COMT
val158met polymorphism and its relationship with individual differences in cognitive
control abilities, there have been few studies that have investigated how COMT variation
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impacts linguistic ambiguity resolution abilities. Reuter, Montag, Peters, Kocher, &
Keifer (2009) recently investigated the role of the COMT val158met polymorphism in
lexical and semantic processing. Although the authors failed to find a significant
association between genetic variation in COMT and semantic priming effects, they found
that subjects homozygous for the met allele demonstrated faster lexical decision latencies
compared to individuals carrying at least one val allele.
Based on this finding and the numerous studies implicating the COMT val158met
polymorphism in cognitive control abilities, we investigated the role of this
polymorphism in both lexical and syntactic ambiguity resolution in the current study.
Specifically, we predicted that individuals with the val/val COMT genotype would
demonstrate exaggerated conflict effects across both the lexical and syntactic ambiguity
resolution tasks compared to those individuals with the met/met COMT genotype.

Methods
Participants
Seventy-one participants (47 women, 24 men, ages 18-35) participated in this study.
Data from nine additional participants were excluded from all analyses for the following
reasons: at-chance performance on the lexical ambiguity resolution task (six subjects) and
technical difficulties with data collection in the syntactic ambiguity resolution task (three
subjects). All subjects were right-handed, native speakers of English, and were not
taking any psychoactive medications. The 71 participants comprised the following racial
and ethnic backgrounds: 56 Caucasian, 5 African American, 1 Asian, 1 Hispanic, and 8
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of mixed race3. Subjects were paid at the rate of $10/hour for their participation, and the
testing session lasted approximately 1.5 hours. Saliva samples were collected from
subjects using OrageneTM collection vials. DNA was extracted using standard procedures
and genotyping for the COMT val158met polymorphism was performed using an Applied
Biosystems TaqMan genotyping assay (see Blasi et al., 2005; Mattay et al., 2003). All
subjects gave informed consent prior to participating in the experiment according to
guidelines established by the Institutional Review Board of the University of
Pennsylvania.
Materials
Syntactic Ambiguity Resolution: Visual World Paradigm
The syntactic ambiguity resolution task used in the current experiment was modeled after
the visual word paradigm developed by Tanenhaus et al. (1995) and Trueswell et al.
(1999). On each trial, subjects heard a sentence that instructed them to move (using a
computer mouse) images of common objects displayed on a monitor (see Farmer, Cargill,
Hindy, Dale, & Spivey, 2006; Farmer, Cargill, & Spivey, 2007). Sentences were
constructed based on those used by Trueswell et al. (1999). Critical trial-types were
either ambiguous (e.g., 1a) or unambiguous sentences (e.g., 1b):
1a) Put the frog on the napkin onto the plate.
1b) Put the frog that’s on the napkin onto the plate.
In sentence 1a, the phrase “on the napkin” introduces a temporary prepositionalphrase attachment ambiguity, as it could either indicate a Destination interpretation
3

In order to maximize power for the genetic analyses, subjects were not excluded on the basis of race or
ethnicity.
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(location where the frog should be put), or a Modifier interpretation (which frog should
be manipulated). In sentence 1b, the inclusion of “that’s” removes this temporary
ambiguity by forcing a Modifier interpretation. Critical trials were presented in only a
one-referent context (e.g., only one frog) as this context induces the “garden-path” effect
(see Tanenhaus et al., 1995; Trueswell et al., 1999).
Both ambiguous and unambiguous sentences began with the verb “put”. In order
to obscure the experimental manipulation, we included 32 filler trials: of these, 16 began
with the verb “put” (e.g. “Put the horse on the cookie sheet”) in order to avoid having
“put” signal the start of critical trial-types. The remaining 16 filler trials began with non“put” verbs (e.g. “Slide the walrus onto the newspaper”). Each subject heard either the
ambiguous or unambiguous version of a critical trial, counterbalanced across subjects.
Two trial orders were also counterbalanced across subjects.
At the start of each trial, an object appeared in each quadrant of the screen along
with auditorily presented labels (spoken by a male) via pre-recorded sound files for each
object. Subjects were then instructed to look at a fixation cross located at the center of
the screen. Upon doing so, a black box surrounding the fixation cross turned green.
Subjects mouse-clicked on the fixation cross to start the trial. Upon clicking the fixation
cross, a pre-recorded sound file with auditory instructions (spoken by a female) played
over speakers. For a sentence such as 1a or 1b, the visual display comprised a frog sitting
on a napkin, a horse, a plate, and an empty napkin, each in a separate quadrant of the
screen. Subjects were instructed to carry out the instructions that they heard by using a
computer mouse. In all trials (both critical and filler trial-types), subjects had to move a
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target object to a particular location. Upon completing the instructed action, subjects
pressed the spacebar in order to start the next trial.
Subjects completed a total of 48 trials comprising the following numbers of each
trial-type: 8 ambiguous, 8 unambiguous, and 32 filler trials.4 Subjects also completed a
practice block of 10 trials prior to starting the experimental blocks in order to familiarize
them with the task procedure. None of the stimuli used in the experimental blocks, nor
any trials resembling ambiguous or unambiguous trials, was presented during the practice
block. Subjects’ eye movements were measured—from the onset of the trial until the end
of the action—using a Tobii 1750 eye-tracker; we calibrated the eye tracker immediately
before beginning this task. The task lasted approximately ten minutes.
Lexical Ambiguity Resolution: Relatedness Judgment Task
The relatedness judgment task was modeled directly after the procedure used by Bedny et
al. (2008). Trial and stimuli design are described briefly below, but we refer the
interested reader to Bedny et al. (2008) for additional details about this paradigm.
Subjects viewed pairs of words and indicated whether the two words were related
to each other in meaning. As in Bedny et al. (2008), subjects were instructed that
“related” referred to two words that were either similar in meaning (e.g. “cat” and “dog”)
or to two words that were associated in meaning (e.g. “dog” and “leash”). Subjects were
4

Subjects also completed a second block of 48 trials of the syntactic task (with the same number of
ambiguous, unambiguous, and filler trials as in the first block). A second block of trials was included in an
attempt to increase our power to assess syntactic conflict effects. However, an examination of overall
reaction times for ambiguous and unambiguous trials (i.e. the time to complete the trial) revealed a
significant reaction time conflict effect (longer RT for ambiguous compared to unambiguous trials) for the
first block, but not for the second block. Thus, it appears that subjects demonstrated learning during the
second block of the task. In light of this result, and the fact that including the second block increases the
number of critical trials well beyond the standard number included in similar studies (e.g. Novick et al.,
2008; Trueswell et al., 1999), only data from the first block are presented in the current study.
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instructed to press a key marked “yes” with their right index finger to indicate that the
words were related to each other, or a key marked “no” with their left index finger to
indicate that the words were not related to each other. Subjects were given 3000 ms to
make each judgment, and subjects were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately
as possible. We use the term “trial” to refer to two consecutive pairs, followed by an
inter-trial-interval (ITI) of 3000 ms (a black screen with four white fixation crosses); the
first pair served as a prime for the second (target) pair on each trial.
There were two critical trial-types of interest: consistent and inconsistent trials.
For both of these trial-types, the second word of each pair was a lexically ambiguous
word5. For consistent trials, the first words of each word pair referenced the same
meaning of the lexically ambiguous word (e.g. GOLD-BAR, SOAP-BAR). For
inconsistent trials, the first words of each word pair referenced different meanings of the
lexically ambiguous word (e.g. SMOKE-BAR, SOAP-BAR). Thus, both consistent and
inconsistent trials contained lexically ambiguous words; however, in the consistent trials,
the prime pair facilitates ambiguity resolution for the target pair. Each subject saw either
the consistent or inconsistent version of a critical trial, counterbalanced across subjects.
For both the prime (first pair) and target (second pair) word pairs, approximately half
referred to the dominant meaning of the lexically ambiguous word and the other half
referred to the subordinate meaning.

5

Some of the ambiguous words were homonyms (e.g., bank); others were polysemous (e.g., chicken). As
Bedny et al. (2008) did not find any behavioral or neural differences between these two types of lexical
ambiguities, and as the distinction between them does not constitute the focus of the current study, both
homonyms and polysemous words will be referred to as lexically ambiguous words. Additionally, all
reported analyses collapse across trials with homonyms and polysemous words.
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The majority of trials were control trials and filler trials: For control trials, words
within each word pair were related to each other; however the two word pairs in each trial
were not related to each other (e.g. COLONEL-LIEUTENANT, FROST-SNOW).
Control trials did not include lexically ambiguous words. Filler trials were also included
in order to obscure the task manipulation. Filler trials comprised the following three
trial-types: two pairs of unrelated words, related words in the first pair and unrelated
words in the second pair, and unrelated words in the first pair and related words in the
second pair. Of the 112 filler trials, 41 included a repeated word, and 63 included a
lexically ambiguous word.
Subjects completed a total of 224 trials: 37 consistent, 37 inconsistent, 38 control,
and 112 filler trials. Trials were divided into five separate blocks, consisting of
approximately 44 trials per block. Subjects also completed a practice block of 46 trials
prior to starting the experimental blocks in order to familiarize them with the task
procedure. None of the stimuli used in the experimental blocks was presented during the
practice block. Trials were presented in a fixed, pseudorandomized design, and the task
took approximately 40 minutes to complete. Stimuli were presented and responses were
collected using E-prime software.
Procedure
Subjects completed the syntactic ambiguity resolution task followed by the lexical
ambiguity resolution task6. Tasks were administered to all subjects in the same order in

6

These subjects were from the same population of subjects who completed the verbal and nonverbal Stroop
tasks as well as the personality assessments described in Chapter 2. The measures described in Chapters 2
and 3 were collected in separate testing sessions. The relationships between subjects’ performance on the
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order to minimize measurement error due to participant x task order interactions (e.g.
Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Friedman et al., 2008; Miyake et al., 2000). Saliva samples
were collected for genotyping purposes at the conclusion of the testing session.
Data Analysis Procedures
For the syntactic ambiguity resolution task, the coordinates of each object in the video
monitor display were used by the eye-tracker system to automatically code participants’
eye movements. Samples indicating subjects’ direction of eye gaze were obtained every
20 ms. As in Novick et al. (2008), trials in which more than 33 % of the samples were
lost due to track-loss were excluded from all analyses. The primary measure of interest
was the proportion of time spent looking at the incorrect goal from the onset of the word
denoting the incorrect goal in the auditory instruction (e.g. “napkin” in the example
above) until the action was completed for both ambiguous and unambiguous trials. This
window was offset by 200 ms in order to allow for the time lag between programming an
eye movement and initiating that eye movement (Matin, Shao, & Boff, 1993). As an
additional measure of interest, the percentage of trials in which a look was made to the
incorrect goal was calculated from the onset of the word indicating the incorrect goal
(e.g. “napkin”, offset by 200 ms).
As in Bedny et al. (2008), the primary behavioral measures of interest for the
lexical ambiguity resolution task were the latency and accuracy of the relatedness
judgments for the second (target) word pair of consistent and inconsistent trials. In order
to ensure that subjects were responding to the second word pair after having been
lexical, syntactic, verbal Stroop, and nonverbal Stroop tasks, as well as the relationship between genetic
variation and individual differences in Stroop performance will be discussed in the General Discussion.
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“primed” successfully with the first word pair, trials in which subjects incorrectly
responded “No” to the first word pair were excluded from all analyses.

Results
Syntactic Ambiguity Resolution: Visual World Paradigm
Means of the proportion of time spent looking at the incorrect goal (offset by 200 ms
from the onset of “napkin” until the end of the trial), percentage of trials with looks to the
incorrect goal, and split-half reliabilities are presented in Table 3.1.
As predicted, subjects spent a greater proportion of time looking at the incorrect
goal on ambiguous compared to unambiguous trials (t[70] = 4.32, p < 0.001)7. A
significant difference in the proportion of time spent looking at the incorrect goal was
also found at the item-level (t[15] = 3.57, p < 0.01). Subjects also demonstrated a higher
percentage of trials with looks to the incorrect goal for the ambiguous compared to the
unambiguous condition (t[70] = 4.40, p < 0.001).
Lexical Ambiguity Resolution: Relatedness Judgment Task
Means of median reaction times (for correct trials), percent error rates, and split-half
reliabilities are presented in Table 3.2; all of the reported reaction time and percent error
rates are for the second word pair of each trial. Results were very similar to those
reported by Bedny et al. (2008): subjects were faster (t[70] = 10.18, p < 0.001) and more
accurate (t[70] = 9.23, p < 0.001) on consistent compared to inconsistent trials.
7

All behavioral analyses involving the proportion time measure for the syntactic task were also performed
using the following arcsin transformation: arcsin ((2 * proportion)-1). The arcsin transformation is used to
adjust for the bounding of proportions between 0 and 1. The analyses performed on transformed data
yielded a similar pattern of results as the analyses performed on untransformed data.
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Individual Differences in Syntactic and Lexical Ambiguity Resolution
Having demonstrated that subjects exhibit conflict effects (i.e. greater difficulty for
inconsistent/ambiguous trials compared to consistent/unambiguous trials) for both the
lexical and syntactic tasks, we next investigated whether there was correlated variation in
conflict resolution abilities across the two tasks. The split-half reliabilities were higher
for ambiguous and unambiguous trial-types in the syntactic ambiguity resolution task
(see Table 3.1) than for the difference score (ambiguous – unambiguous) (SpearmanBrown split-half reliability coefficient = 0.28). Similarly, the split-half reliabilities were
high for reaction times on consistent and inconsistent trials in the lexical ambiguity
resolution task (see Table 3.2); however, the reliability for the difference score
(inconsistent RT – consistent RT) was rather low (Spearman-Brown split-half reliability
coefficient = 0.37). Several researchers have noted the unreliability of difference scores
(e.g. Cronbach & Furby, 1970; Edwards, 1994). Thus, rather than using difference scores
as measures of lexical and syntactic conflict in our correlational analyses, we adopted a
regression approach that involves calculating residual change scores (see Edwards, 1994;
Friedman & Miyake, 2004). Furthermore, as the difference score in reaction times can
become larger as subjects’ overall speed increases, employing a regression approach
allowed us to account for overall processing speed (see also Wager, Jonides, & Smith,
2006 for a similar approach). Across subjects, median response times for the inconsistent
trials of the lexical ambiguity resolution task were regressed on median response times
for the consistent trials; the residuals from this regression were then used as the measure
of lexical conflict for each subject and will be referred to as residual conflict scores. The
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same approach was used for the syntactic ambiguity resolution task, where the measures
of performance were the proportion of time spent looking at the incorrect goal for
ambiguous and unambiguous trials. Correlations were then calculated between subjects’
residual conflict scores for the lexical and syntactic tasks. The split-half reliabilities for
the syntactic and lexical residual conflict scores were higher (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2) than
for the difference scores reported above.
A significant correlation was found between residual conflict scores for lexical
and syntactic tasks (Pearson r = 0.235, p < 0.05; Spearman’s rho = 0.27, p < 0.05)
(Figure 3.1). The finding of correlated variation in performance across lexical and
syntactic ambiguity resolution tasks suggests that common mechanisms may be involved
in resolving both of these types of linguistic ambiguities.
The correlational analysis between lexical and syntactic residual conflict scores
does not address the possibility that non-specific factors, such as general ability or
arousal, may underlie the correlation between lexical and syntactic conflict scores. In
order to determine the specificity of the relationship between performance on the lexical
and syntactic ambiguity resolution tasks, we investigated the correlations between lexical
and syntactic trial-types separately, using the lexical consistent and syntactic
unambiguous trials as “negative controls”. Under the constraint-satisfaction account, one
would expect a correlation between performance on the syntactic ambiguous and lexical
inconsistent trials, but not between the syntactic unambiguous and lexical consistent
trials. That is, the syntactic ambiguous and lexical inconsistent trials are the trials in
which a common conflict resolution mechanism might be recruited. As predicted, we
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found that subjects’ proportion of time spent looking at the incorrect goal on ambiguous
trials in the syntactic task was correlated with their reaction times for inconsistent trials in
the lexical task (Pearson r = 0.30, p < 0.05; Spearman’s rho = 0.20, p = 0.09) (Figure 3.2
A). However, subjects’ proportion of time spent looking at the incorrect goal for
unambiguous trials in the syntactic task was not significantly correlated with their
reaction times for consistent trials in the lexical task (Pearson r = -0.16, p = 0.18;
Spearman’s rho = -0.11, p = 0.36) (Figure 3.2 B). Additionally, the strength of these
correlations (r = 0.30 vs. r = -.16) was significantly different (z = 3.38, p < 0.001).
We also investigated whether the difference between ambiguous and
unambiguous syntactic trials in terms of the percentage of trials with looks to the
incorrect goal (instead of proportion of time on each trial) would be correlated with the
lexical residual conflict effect. Although this relationship was not significant (Pearson r
= 0.14, p = 0.24; Spearman’s rho = 0.17, p = 0.16), it suggested a positive relationship
between these measures. We also calculated correlations separately between syntactic
ambiguous and lexical inconsistent trials, and also between syntactic unambiguous and
lexical consistent trials, for these measures. A significant correlation was found between
the percentage of ambiguous trials in which subjects made a look to the incorrect goal in
the syntactic task and their reaction times for inconsistent trials in the lexical task
(Pearson r = 0.29, p < 0.05; Spearman’s rho = 0.22, p = 0.06) (Figure 3.3 A). However,
the correlation between these measures was not significant for syntactic unambiguous
and lexical consistent trials (Pearson r = -0.11, p = 0.37; Spearman’s rho = -0.07, p =
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0.59) (Figure 3.3 B). Additionally, the strength of the correlations (r = 0.29 vs. r = -0.11)
was significantly different (z = 3.26, p < 0.01).
Genetic Contributions to Individual Differences in Ambiguity Resolution
Data from two subjects were excluded from all genetic analyses due to inability to obtain
a genotype. This left a total of 69 subjects for the genetic analyses. Subjects’ syntactic
residual conflict scores were submitted to a one-way ANOVA to test for differences in
the magnitude of syntactic conflict effects across the COMT genotype groups. The
results of this analysis revealed a significant difference in syntactic conflict effects across
COMT genotype groups (F[2,66] = 3.17, p < 0.05). However, as Levene’s test indicated
that the assumption of homogeneity of variance across the genotype groups was violated
(F[2,66] = 8.42, p < 0.01), we also report the Brown-Forsythe (F[2, 28.1] = 2.66, p =
0.088) and Welch tests (F[2, 32] = 2.08, p = 0.14), which do not assume homogeneity of
variance. Based on these trends, Games-Howell post-hoc tests, which do not assume
homogeneity of variance, were conducted. Although not statistically significant, the
val/val genotype group tended to have higher syntactic residual conflict scores compared
to both the met/met genotype group (p = 0.13) and the val/met genotype group (p = 0.28)
(see Table 3.3).
The one-way ANOVA for lexical residual conflict scores did not yield a
significant effect of genotype, suggesting that the COMT genotype groups were not
differentially associated with the magnitude of lexical conflict (F < 1). However, given
that both the consistent and inconsistent trials involve lexically ambiguous words, we
performed an exploratory analysis to investigate whether COMT val158met genotype was
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associated with performance across both consistent and inconsistent trials of the lexical
task. Subjects’ reaction times for consistent, inconsistent, control, and filler trials were
submitted to a repeated-measures mixed ANOVA with lexical task condition (consistent,
inconsistent, control, filler) as a within-subjects factor and COMT val158met genotype as
a between-subjects factor. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity
was violated (χ2(5) = 32.9, p < 0.001). Accordingly, the Greenhouse-Geisser estimate of
sphericity (ε = 0.76) was used to correct the degrees of freedom. A significant condition
x genotype interaction effect was found, due to a differential effect of COMT genotype
on the response times for the different lexical task conditions (F[4.53, 149.43] = 2.63, p <
0.05). This result indicates specificity in the association between COMT genotype and
response times across the lexical task conditions. In order to investigate whether COMT
genotype impacted both consistent and inconsistent trials, a repeated-measures mixed
ANOVA was performed with task condition (consistent, inconsistent) as a withinsubjects factor and COMT genotype as a between-subjects factor. A main effect of
COMT genotype was found, indicating a significant difference in performance between
the genotype groups across both consistent and inconsistent trials (F[2,66] = 3.87, p <
0.05). No significant condition x genotype interaction effect was found (F < 1). Posthoc Tukey’s HSD tests revealed that the val/val genotype group had significantly slower
reaction times across both consistent and inconsistent trials compared to the val/met
genotype group (p < 0.05) (see Table 3.4). All other pairwise comparisons were not
significant (p’s > 0.25).
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A repeated-measures mixed ANOVA for response times on the control and filler
trials failed to reveal a significant main effect of genotype nor a condition x genotype
interaction effect (F’s < 1).

These results demonstrate the specificity of the association

between COMT genotype and reaction times on the different conditions of the lexical
ambiguity resolution task. In particular, the val/val subjects did not demonstrate slower
reaction times across all conditions. Rather, their performance was impaired only on
those trials involving processing of lexical ambiguities8.

Discussion
A key prediction of constraint-satisfaction models of language processing is that lexical
and syntactic ambiguities are resolved using the same mechanisms (MacDonald et al.,
1994; Trueswell & Tanenhaus, 1994). In contrast, serial models propose that lexical and
syntactic ambiguities are resolved via separate processing mechanisms (see Frazier,
1995).
In the current study, we found a significant correlation between lexical and
syntactic ambiguity resolution abilities. Moreover, further investigation of this result
demonstrated the specificity of the correlation. In particular, a significant correlation was
found for performance across lexical inconsistent and syntactic ambiguous trials.
Additionally, this correlation was significantly stronger than the correlation for
8

In light of these results, we calculated separate correlations between subjects’ syntactic residual conflict
scores and their reaction times for inconsistent and consistent trials. Significant correlations were found
between syntactic conflict and reaction times for inconsistent trials (Pearson r = 0.39, p < 0.01; Spearman’s
rho = 0.22, p = 0.06) as well as reaction times for consistent trials (Pearson r = 0.31, p < 0.01; Spearman’s
rho = 0.15, p = 0.21). Thus, lexical consistent trials may invoke some conflict, although not as much as in
lexical inconsistent trials.
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performance across lexical consistent and syntactic unambiguous trials. This finding
mitigates the concern that the correlation across the lexical and syntactic ambiguity
resolution tasks was due to non-specific factors, such as general ability. If this had been
the case, we would have also found a significant correlation across lexical consistent and
syntactic unambiguous trials. However, this correlation was not significant.
These results provide support for constraint-satisfaction models of language
processing by demonstrating that lexical and syntactic ambiguity resolution abilities rely
on similar processing mechanisms. The correlation between ambiguity resolution
abilities across these two tasks would not be predicted by serial models of language
processing and thus serve as a means of distinguishing these two classes of models.
Although proponents of serial models may characterize this correlation as reflecting the
relationship between post-syntactic and post-lexical processes, eye movement measures
reflect early processes that are unlikely to be post-syntactic in nature. One potential
criticism of the current set of results concerns the magnitude of the observed correlation
(a Pearson r value of 0.235) between lexical and syntactic ambiguity resolution abilities.
At first blush, explaining 5-6 % percent of the variance in the conflict effects across these
two tasks may seem unimpressive. However, it is useful to place an upper bound on how
high of a magnitude we might expect for the correlation between lexical and syntactic
conflict effects. One source of such an upper bound stems from Novick et al.’s (2008)
study, which employed two types of syntactic ambiguities: prepositional-phrase
attachment ambiguities, assessed via the visual world paradigm, as well as directobject/sentence-complement ambiguities, assessed via a reading task. Novick et al.
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(2008) reported a Pearson r value of 0.52 for the correlation between ambiguity
resolution abilities across these two tasks. Although the magnitude of the correlation
reported in the current study is smaller than this value, it is important to note that we
would not have expected a Pearson r value greater than 0.52. Furthermore, a calculation
of the 95 % confidence interval for this correlation with Novick et al’s sample size of 40
participants yielded the following range of values: 0.25 to 0.72. Thus, although not
within this range, our finding of a correlation of 0.235 is reasonably close to the lower
bound of this confidence interval. The split-half reliability estimates of lexical and
syntactic residual conflict scores can be used as another source of the upper bound for the
expected magnitude of the correlation between these conflict scores. Based on the rather
low split-half reliabilities reported in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the magnitude of the correlation
between lexical and syntactic conflict scores would not be expected to be higher than
these values.
In addition, we would like to emphasize the number of differences that exist
between the two tasks employed in the current study. In the syntactic ambiguity
resolution task, subjects’ eye movements were monitored as they carried out auditory
instructions by moving objects using a computer mouse. In the lexical ambiguity
resolution task, these subjects were instructed to indicate the relatedness of word pairs,
and the primary measure of interest was their reaction time to do so. Our finding of a
significant correlation between measures as disparate as eye movements and button press
reaction times provides a strong test of the constraint-satisfaction hypothesis. Although a
stronger correlation may have been obtained had we utilized reaction time measures for
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both the syntactic and lexical ambiguity resolution tasks, this may have resulted from
more superficial similarities between the tasks. Thus, by using two very different tasks,
our finding of correlated variation in performance across these tasks is all the more
intriguing. Our results thus build upon the results reported by Novick et al. (2008), as we
have shown that their finding can be extended to lexical ambiguity resolution tasks where
subjects are assessing the relationship between single words. Further research is
necessary in order to investigate the extent to which different types of lexical and
syntactic ambiguities rely on shared processing mechanisms. The current study used the
prepositional phrase attachment ambiguity as an example of a syntactic ambiguity and
both homonyms and polysemous words as examples of lexical ambiguities. Future
studies should explore whether the finding of the current study extends to other types of
linguistic ambiguities, such as reduced relatives as well as quantifier and scope
ambiguities.
An additional novel feature of the current study involves the investigation of the
neurotransmitter systems underlying linguistic ambiguity resolution abilities. The results
of the current study indicate that variation in a gene that regulates dopamine levels in
prefrontal cortex is related to linguistic ambiguity resolution abilities. Those subjects
with the variant of the COMT val158met polymorphism associated with lower levels of
prefrontal cortical dopamine (val/val genotype group) tended to demonstrate larger
conflict effects on the syntactic ambiguity resolution task relative to the other genotype
groups. Although the magnitude of lexical conflict did not significantly differ between
the COMT genotype groups, an exploratory analysis revealed that subjects with the
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val/val genotype demonstrated longer reaction times for both consistent and inconsistent
trials in the lexical ambiguity resolution task. As both consistent and inconsistent trials
involve lexically ambiguous words, this finding may indicate that subjects with the
val/val genotype have greater difficulty with processing ambiguities, perhaps in addition
to difficulty with resolving linguistic conflict. These results are consistent with those of
Reuter et al. (2009), who found that subjects with the val/val genotype demonstrated
longer lexical decision latencies compared to other COMT genotype groups. However,
the current set of results extends this finding to show that genetic variation in COMT also
appears to be associated with linguistic ambiguity resolution abilities. We note that the
behavioral genetic findings reported in the current study were not statistically robust and
only indicate trends. Nonetheless, these findings are intriguing in nature and constitute
preliminary novel evidence suggesting commonality between linguistic ambiguity
resolution and cognitive control mechanisms at the neurotransmitter level. Furthermore,
these results serve to bridge the literatures on linguistic ambiguity resolution with the
extensive literature on the role of dopamine in cognitive control abilities.
In conclusion, the current study provides support for constraint-satisfaction
models of language processing. Using an individual differences approach, we have
shown that individuals’ ability to resolve lexical ambiguities is related to their ability to
resolve syntactic ambiguities. As an extension of the current study, it would be
interesting to investigate whether neural co-localization would be found in lVLPFC
within subjects performing both the lexical and syntactic ambiguity resolution tasks.
Based on the current set of results as well as previous studies, one would predict that this
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result would be obtained. Additionally, it would be interesting to investigate whether
variation in the COMT genotype would be associated with the extent of lVLPFC
activation during resolution of both lexical and syntactic ambiguities. The combination
of different methodologies holds great promise for elucidating our understanding of the
processing mechanisms underlying ambiguity resolution across different domains of
cognition. The results of the current study demonstrate an example of such an approach.
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Table 3.1. Performance Summary for Syntactic Ambiguity Resolution Task.

Syntactic Trial-Type

Mean Proportion of Time

SD

Ambiguous
Unambiguous
Ambiguous - Unambiguous

0.033
0.019
0.014

0.028
0.019
0.027

Reliability Mean % Trials SD
0.42
0.62
0.34a

36.2
25.2
11.1

23.4
21.7
21.2

Note. Syntactic Trial-Type, each trial-type in the visual world paradigm as well as the
(Ambiguous-Unambiguous) difference score; Mean Proportion of Time, mean proportion
of time spent looking at the incorrect goal from the onset of the word denoting the
incorrect goal (e.g. “napkin”, offset by 200 ms) until the end of the trial; Reliability, splithalf reliability (odd-even) adjusted with the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula. SD
corresponds to standard deviation. N = 71 for all measures.
a

Split-half reliability is reported for the residual conflict score (reliability coefficient for
difference score reported in the main text).
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Table 3.2. Performance Summary for Lexical Ambiguity Resolution Task.
Lexical Trial-Type

Mean RT SD

Mean Percent Error

SD

Reliability
0.87
0.81
0.42a

Consistent
Inconsistent
Inconsistent - Consistent

1008
1154
146

165
204
121

20.3
30.7
10.5

13.3
16.1
10.5

Control
Filler

1141
1233

134
132

7
6.5

5.6
2.8

Note. Lexical Trial-Type, each trial-type in the relatedness judgment task as well as the
(Inconsistent-Consistent) RT difference score; Reliability, split-half reliability (odd-even)
for critical trials adjusted with the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula. SD corresponds
to standard deviation. N = 71 for all measures.
a

Split-half reliability is reported for the residual conflict score (reliability coefficient for
difference score reported in the main text).
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Table 3.3. Syntactic Conflict Effects for COMT val158met Genotype Groups.
COMT val158met Genotype Group

Mean Syntactic Residual Conflict Score

SD

val/val (n = 16)
val/met (n = 35)
met/met (n = 18)

0.013
-0.002
-0.007

0.038
0.022
0.016

Note. SD corresponds to standard deviation.
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Table 3.4. Performance of COMT val158met Genotype Groups on Lexical Ambiguity
Resolution Task (critical trials).
COMT val158met Genotype Group

Mean Consistent RT SD

val/val (n = 16)
val/met (n = 35)
met/met (n = 18)

1089
960
1035

199
144
137

Mean Inconsistent RT

SD

1243
1103
1183

253
187
152

Note. RTs correspond to mean of median reaction times. SD corresponds to standard
deviation.
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Figure Captions

Figure 3.1. Correlation between residual conflict scores for syntactic and lexical
ambiguity resolution tasks. Corresponding Pearson r and Spearman’s rho coefficients
provided in main text.

Figure 3.2. Correlations between syntactic trials (proportion of time spent looking at the
incorrect goal from the onset of “napkin”) and lexical trials (median RT in milliseconds)
for (A) Syntactic ambiguous trials and lexical inconsistent trials and (B) Syntactic
unambiguous trials and lexical consistent trials. Corresponding Pearson r and Spearman’s
rho coefficients provided in main text.

Figure 3.3. Correlations between syntactic trials (% trials with looks to the incorrect goal
from the onset of “napkin”) and lexical trials (median RT in milliseconds) for (A)
Syntactic ambiguous trials and lexical inconsistent trials and (B) Syntactic unambiguous
trials and lexical consistent trials. Corresponding Pearson r and Spearman’s rho
coefficients provided in main text.
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Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.3.
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CHAPTER 4: GENERAL DISCUSSION
What are the factors that influence our ability to modulate behavior in a contextdependent fashion? The answer to this question is undoubtedly complex and
multifaceted in nature. In the studies described in Chapters 2 and 3, we demonstrate how
the use of an individual-differences approach reveals a few facets of this answer. By
viewing human behavior through the lens of variation in personality traits, cognitive
control, and linguistic ambiguity resolution abilities, we were able to demonstrate the
following findings. In Chapter 2, we showed that individual differences in the
personality traits of approach and avoidance are associated with variability in verbal and
nonverbal cognitive control abilities, respectively. These results highlight the differences
between cognitive control abilities in the verbal and nonverbal domains. In Chapter 3,
we demonstrated how an individual-differences approach can reveal the commonality
between processing mechanisms. Within the domain of language processing, we showed
correlated variation in lexical and syntactic ambiguity resolution abilities. Furthermore,
through the use of behavioral genetics techniques, we have illustrated how variation at
the genetic level can be used to elucidate our understanding of individual differences in
ambiguity resolution abilities. Specifically, we showed that variation in a gene related to
the regulation of dopamine in prefrontal cortex was associated with the ability to process
both lexical and syntactic ambiguities. Below, we discuss the implications of each of
these findings in greater detail.
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Individual Differences in Personality & Cognitive Control
In Chapter 2, we focused on the domain-specific aspects of cognitive control abilities. In
discussing the need for future work to investigate the relationship between
approach/avoidance and specific cognitive control abilities, Gray (2001) noted that if in
fact both cognitive control and approach/avoidance sensitivities are organized in a
hemisphere-specific fashion, “The most simple prediction of the current account is that
cognitive control functions that show hemispheric specialization in PFC will also show
selective modulation by approach and withdrawal states” (p. 448). Our results are
partially consistent with this prediction. In particular, we found that the overlap across
the Behavioral Activation System (BAS) and Extraversion, or approach sensitivity,
predicted performance on the verbal Stroop task, whereas the overlap across the
Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) and Neuroticism, or avoidance sensitivity, predicted
performance on the nonverbal Stroop task.
It is important to note that although approach sensitivity predicted verbal, but not
nonverbal, Stroop conflict effects, we did not find a significant difference between the
strength of these correlations. Similarly, although avoidance sensitivity predicted
nonverbal, but not verbal, Stroop conflict effects, no significant difference was found in
the strength of these correlations. As a result, we are unable to make a strong claim
regarding the interaction of personality and cognitive control in a domain-specific
manner. Nonetheless, given the prior literature on the differential roles of the right and
left prefrontal cortex for verbal/nonverbal cognitive control and approach/avoidance
sensitivities, our results are suggestive of a hemisphere-specific association between
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motivational personality traits and cognitive control abilities. Thus, the correlation
between approach and verbal Stroop performance may reflect the reliance of both of
these systems on left prefrontal cortex, and the association between avoidance and nonverbal Stroop may reflect the fact that both are subserved by right prefrontal cortex.
What implications do these findings have for the organization of cognitive control
processing mechanisms? As Gray (2001) speculated, one possibility is that the
association between verbal cognitive control and approach could represent merely “an
uninteresting consequence of co-lateralization” (p. 448). Gray (2001) also suggested the
possibility that these hemisphere-congruent associations may reflect the differential
distribution of neurochemical pathways across the left and right hemispheres. Whereas
dopamine pathways tend to be more heavily concentrated in the left hemisphere,
norepinephrine pathways are more right-lateralized (see Tucker & Williamson, 1984 for a
review). Furthermore, dopaminergic and norepinephrine systems in prefrontal cortex
have been shown to be mutually inhibitory (Tassin, 1998). Thus, it is possible that the
incompatible motivational systems of approach and avoidance are segregated on a
hemispheric basis, with differential reliance on dopaminergic and norephinephrine
neurotransmistter systems (see Depue & Collins, 1999; Gray & McNaughton, 2000).
Similarly, the hemispheric specialization for verbal and nonverbal cognitive control may
stem from their differential reliance on dopaminergic and norepinephrine systems. For
example, previous studies have shown that norepinephrine plays a larger role in spatial
working memory abilities compared to dopamine (e.g. Rossetti & Carboni, 2005; Tucker
& Williamson, 1984).
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In sum, the use of an individual-differences approach allowed us to uncover a
source of variation in performance on one of the most commonly used tests of cognitive
control ability: the Stroop task. Furthermore, we were able to demonstrate relationships
between personality and a specific cognitive control ability (response inhibition) in an
unselected, cognitively unimpaired population; a population that serves as the focus in
the majority of experimental psychology studies. Thus, we have shown that variability in
cognitive control performance, which may be considered as noise by some researchers, is
significantly correlated with variation in personality traits. This finding carries important
implications for all studies that employ laboratory tests of cognitive control and uncovers
a source of variability in task performance that is related to personality trait
characteristics.

Individual Differences in Ambiguity Resolution Abilities
In Chapter 3, we used an individual-differences approach to investigate commonality in
processing mechanisms within the domain of language processing. In particular, we
provided a critical test of constraint-satisfaction theories by investigating whether
variation in lexical ambiguity resolution abilities is related to variation in syntactic
ambiguity resolution abilities. Inherent in MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg’s
(1994) claim that syntactic ambiguities are ambiguities at the lexical level, is the
prediction that individual differences in ambiguity resolution should be related across
lexical and syntactic tasks.
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The results of Chapter 3 demonstrated correlated variation in lexical and syntactic
ambiguity resolution abilities. Thus, our results appear to provide support for
MacDonald et al.’s (1994) assertion that across the domains of lexical and syntactic
processing, “the same ambiguity resolution mechanisms apply in both domains because
both involve ambiguities over various types of lexical representations” (p. 682).
Furthermore, it is important to note that our findings provide a strong test of constraintsatisfaction theories by demonstrating correlated variation in performance across two
tasks that differ across a variety of characteristics, such as the measures of processing
difficulty (reaction times vs. eye movements) and type of stimuli (visually presented
word pairs vs. auditorily presented sentences).
MacDonald et al. (1994) also propose that “whereas there may be distinctly
linguistic forms of representation, the processing principles that account for language
comprehension and ambiguity resolution are not specific to language at all” (p. 700). As
the same subjects completed the tasks described in Chapters 2 and 3, we were able to test
this proposal. Indeed, we selected the verbal Stroop, nonverbal Stroop, and the lexical
and syntactic ambiguity resolution tasks on the basis of previous neuroimaging (e.g.
Bedny et al., 2008; January et al., 2009; Ye & Zhou, 2009), and neuropsychological (e.g.
Novick et al., 2009) studies suggesting that these tasks may all rely on more general
cognitive control processing abilities. However, despite the promising evidence
suggesting links between linguistic ambiguity resolution and more general cognitive
control abilities, we did not observe significant correlations between individual
differences in the lexical and syntactic ambiguity resolution tasks and performance on the
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verbal and nonverbal Stroop tasks described in Chapter 2. The failure to find significant
correlations with these standard measures of cognitive control is rather surprising.
However, we can offer a few potential explanations for these null results. One
explanation stems from the separate sessions (on separate days) in which subjects were
tested on the lexical and syntactic tasks (Session 1) and the verbal and nonverbal Stroop
tasks (Session 3). As discussed above, state manipulations of affect have been shown to
influence performance on cognitive control tasks (e.g. Gray, 2001; Rowe et al., 2007;
Shackman et al., 2006). Thus, it is possible that differences in the subjects’ emotional
states between sessions may have affected their performance on the various tasks that
they performed, thus potentially obscuring the relationships between tasks in different
sessions. In order to address this hypothesis, subjects should be tested on all four tasks
(lexical, syntactic, verbal Stroop, and nonverbal Stroop) within the same experimental
session in a future study.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the nonverbal Stroop task served as our
only measure of conflict in the nonverbal domain compared with three tasks assessing
conflict in the verbal domain. Thus, an interesting extension of the current study would
involve the use of latent variables derived from several measures of both verbal and
nonverbal conflict in order to obtain a “purer” measure of each (e.g. Friedman et al.,
2008; Miyake et al., 2000). A latent-variable approach may allow us to more effectively
examine the domain-generality of cognitive control mechanisms across verbal and
nonverbal domains.
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Individual Differences at the Genetic Level: Variation in Dopamine Regulation
We also investigated individual differences at the level of genetic variation. This
approach enabled us to go beyond the question of whether processing mechanisms are
related and instead, ask how they might be related. Genetic variation in the COMT gene,
which plays an important role in dopamine regulation in prefrontal cortex, has been
associated with variability in performance on cognitive control tasks (see Goldberg &
Weinberger, 2004 for a review). As the verbal and nonverbal Stroop tasks as well as the
lexical and syntactic ambiguity resolution tasks have been suggested to rely on cognitive
control processing mechanisms, we tested the hypothesis that the COMT val158met
polymorphism would be associated with performance on these tasks9. A marginally
significant task x genotype interaction effect was found (F[6,192] = 1.96, p = 0.07),
indicating a differential effect of COMT genotype across the four tasks. In order to
investigate this interaction effect further, separate one-way ANOVAs were performed on
the standardized residuals from each task. Only the ANOVA for the syntactic ambiguity
resolution task yielded a significant main effect of genotype (results reported in Chapter
3). As discussed in Chapter 3, further investigation of this effect indicated that subjects
with the val/val genotype showed a trend toward higher syntactic conflict scores
compared to the other genotypes. Furthermore an exploratory analysis of subjects’

9

Data from 2 additional subjects were excluded from all genetic analyses due to missing data for one or
more tasks. This left a total of 67 subjects for the genetic analyses across all four tasks. Standardized
residuals were first calculated for each task, predicting subjects’ performance on ambiguous trials from
their performance on unambiguous trials. For the lexical ambiguity resolution task, subjects’ reaction times
on inconsistent trials were predicted from their reaction times on consistent trials. These standardized
residuals were then submitted to a repeated-measures mixed ANOVA with the within-subjects factor of
task (verbal Stroop, nonverbal Stroop, lexical, and syntactic) and the between-subjects factor of COMT
val158met genotype.
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reaction times for the lexical ambiguity resolution task revealed that subjects with the
val/val genotype demonstrated significantly greater difficulty on trials containing a
lexical ambiguity (consistent and inconsistent trials). Importantly, val/val subjects did
not demonstrate greater difficulty for control and filler trials, demonstrating the
specificity of the effect to processing lexical ambiguities.
How does this finding inform our understanding of the nature of the processing
mechanisms underlying lexical and syntactic ambiguity resolution? Some researchers
have found that subjects with the val/val genotype tend to demonstrate impaired
performance on tasks that tap inhibitory control abilities, such as the stop-signal (e.g.
Congdon, Constable, Lesch, & Canli, 2009) and flanker (e.g. Blasi et al., 2005) tasks.
Both the syntactic and lexical ambiguity resolution tasks invoke conflict between
competing linguistic representations. Successful performance on the lexical ambiguity
resolution task may involve inhibition of the meaning of the lexically ambiguous word
that is primed by the first word pair in order to judge the words in the target pair as
related. Similarly, successful performance on the syntactic ambiguity resolution task
may involve inhibition of the initial interpretation of the incorrect goal (e.g. the empty
napkin) as a destination in order to successfully arrive at the correct interpretation of the
linguistic input. Thus, if val/val individuals are characterized by impaired or inefficient
inhibitory control mechanisms, they may experience increased difficulty in situations that
require successful inhibition. Our finding that val/val individuals demonstrate greater
difficulty in processing linguistic ambiguities parallels COMT findings in the cognitive
control literature, where several studies have reported that subjects with the val/val
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genotype demonstrate greater difficulty on cognitive control tasks, such as the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Task (e.g. Malhotra et al., 2002) and the n-back task (e.g. Goldberg et al.,
2003). Although preliminary in nature and not statistically robust, our results constitute
novel findings, as the resolution of lexical and syntactic ambiguities has not yet been
investigated at the neurotransmitter level. In sum, beyond confirmation of the predictions
of constraint-satisfaction theories, we were also able to shed light on the nature of the
common processing mechanism that appears to resolve both lexical and syntactic
ambiguities.
It is interesting to note that a significant association between COMT genotype and
conflict resolution ability emerged for the linguistic ambiguity resolution tasks, but not
for the Stroop tasks. This finding is surprising, given that the behavioral genetic
literature on COMT has focused primarily on cognitive control tasks. However, the
association between variation in COMT genotype and performance on the Stroop task has
only been investigated in a few studies, and the results appear mixed (e.g. Reueter et al.,
2005; Sommer, Fossella, Fan, & Posner, 2003). One possibility for our finding of an
association between the COMT gene and performance on the lexical and syntactic tasks
may stem from their greater sensitivity to processing difficulty. Subjects appear to have
found the lexical ambiguity resolution task more difficult, in the form of higher error
rates compared with the Stroop tasks. Furthermore, our measure of eye movements in the
syntactic task may serve as a more sensitive measure of processing difficulty compared to
reaction times in the Stroop tasks. Thus, it may be the case that there is an association
between COMT and Stroop performance, albeit weak in nature, and we possessed
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insufficient power to detect this association. Consequently, enlarging our sample size
may prove beneficial in detecting this association. Indeed, the sample size employed in
the current study is smaller than is typically used in genetic association studies.
We also failed to find an association between individual differences in approach
sensitivity and genetic variation in COMT. At first blush, this failure may seem
surprising given the suggestion (discussed above) that both approach sensitivity and
verbal cognitive control abilities rely on dopamine signaling pathways. However, it is
important to note that although COMT plays an important role in the regulation of
dopamine levels in the prefrontal cortex, several other genes, including DRD4, DRD2,
and DAT, play key roles in dopamine regulation as well (see Goldberg & Weinberger,
2004 for a review). Furthermore, interactions between these genes have been associated
with both personality traits (e.g. BAS sensitivity, Reuter, Schmitz, Corr, & Hennig, 2006)
and cognitive control abilities (e.g. Kramer et al., 2007). As complex behaviors are likely
to be supported by multiple genes, future investigations of individual differences in
personality and ambiguity resolution abilities should include the study of gene-gene
interactions.

CONCLUSIONS
The study of individual differences is essential to gaining a greater understanding of the
psychological and neural systems that support behavior. The results of the current set of
studies demonstrate how an individual-differences approach can be used to shed light on
the processing mechanisms underlying several different domains of behavior. By looking
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at the areas of personality, cognitive control, and language processing through the lens of
individual differences, we have uncovered meaningful sources of variability in human
behavior. In particular, we have demonstrated that individual differences in personality
dimensions are associated with variation in cognitive control abilities, suggestive of a
hemisphere-specific organization of systems mediating motivational and cognitive
control processing mechanisms. Additionally, we have shown that an individualdifferences approach reveals commonality in processing across both behavioral and
genetic levels for tasks featuring lexical and syntactic ambiguities.
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